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THE RELATION BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND INSIDER OWNERSHIP IN 
DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides new international evidence on the relationship between 
dividend policy and insider ownership by analysing a sample of firms from 
countries characterised by an Anglo-Saxon tradition and a matching sample 
of companies from countries with Civil Law legal systems. We hypothesize 
that,  due  to  the  different  characteristics  of  both  the  legal  system  and  the 
nature of agency conflicts in firms from those countries, the relation between 
dividend  policies  and  ownership  by  insiders  will  be  considerably  distinct 
between the two sets of companies. We find that while in firms from Anglo-
Saxon tradition the relation between dividends and insider ownership follows 
the pattern negative-positive-negative, in Civil Law countries the relation is 
positive-negative-positive. These results are consistent with our hypotheses 
and  breed  new  insights  into  the  role  of  dividend  policy  as  a  disciplining 






Keywords: dividend policy, corporate governance, insider ownership, 
international financial markets 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G35, G15   3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  The question of why companies pay out dividends has given rise to 
various  explanations  amongst  which  our  interest  centres  on  those  arising 
from the agency theory (Easterbrook, 1984). In line also with that branch of 
new institutional economics that has come to be called the Law & Finance 
approach (La Porta et al, 1998) , we compare the dividend policies adopted 
by firms in countries with different legal environments, in an attempt to obtain 
broader  empirical  evidence  than  that  which  has  been  obtained  almost 
exclusively for US or UK firms. 
  In this line of research, the degree of investor protection along with 
other  aspects  of  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  is  an  important 
determinant of ownership and control structures of companies with different 
geographic origins. Some evidence (e.g., Morck et al, 1988) suggests that 
the concentration of ownership among insider shareholders may be seen, at 
least within a certain range, as a possible solution for the agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control when the protection of 
investors  in general,  and shareholders in  particular, is  not sufficiently  well 
guaranteed  by  the  legal  and  jurisdictional  framework.  In  addition,  it  also 
appears to be the case that the greater the degree of protection offered to 
investors, the greater the development of the financial markets and the value 
of corporations (La Porta el al, 2002).  
  In  this  context,  one  may  wonder  how  these  two  factors  (insider 
ownership and the legal environment) impact on company dividend policies 
given the theoretical arguments (Easterbrook, 1984, and Jensen, 1986) and 
existing evidence (e.g.. Rozeff, 1982, Crutchley and Hansen, 1989) in favour 
of  a  monitoring  role  for  dividends  in  large  firms  where  conflicts  between 
shareholders and managers are potentially important. Jensen suggests that 
dividends can avoid managerial discretion in the use of free cash flow, while 
Easterbrook argues that dividends facilitate the supervision of investments   4 
made in the firm by increasing the frequency of primary capital financing and 
associated monitoring. 
However,  when  analysing  the  relationship  between  dividends  and 
insider  ownership,  a  non-linearity  may  occur,  as  documented  by  Farinha 
(2003) for UK firms. The use of dividends may indeed be greater when an 
insider entrenchment effect predominates at high ownership levels (due, for 
instance,  to  lower  takeover  likelihood)  while  at  lower  ownership  levels, 
dividends may be a substitute for alignment-inducing insider ownership. It is, 
therefore, essential to determine the levels at which insider ownership can 
cause that change of tendency that makes dividends all the more necessary.  
  The focus of our analysis is the argument that when companies belong 
to  different  institutional  environments  and  the  nature  of  existing  agency 
problems also differs, the relationship between dividend policy and insider 
ownership will also be distinct. 
  We hypothesize that, due to the different characteristics of both the 
legal system and the nature of agency conflicts in firms from those countries, 
the  relation  between  dividend  policies  and  ownership  by  insiders  will  be 
considerably distinct between those two sets of companies. In accordance 
with  our  hypotheses,  we  find  that  in  firms  from  an  Anglo-Saxon  tradition 
where  the  main  conflict  of  interests  is  arguably  between  managers  and 
shareholders, the relation between dividends and insider ownership follows 
the  pattern  negative-positive-negative.  In  contrast,  in  Civil  Law  countries, 
where  there  is  typically  little  separation  between  ownership  and  control, 
conflicts are mainly between large shareholders that control the decisions of 
firm and minority shareholders. And so, the relation between dividends and 
insider ownership is different and it will follow the pattern positive-negative-
positive. Our study also concludes that these differences are persistent over 
time.   
With this purpose, we use a data panel of firms of European countries from 
both the Anglo-Saxon and Civil legal origins, as in Laporta et al. (2000b). 
However, in addition to that study, we take into consideration the ownership   5 
of  individual  firms.  Our  contribution  is  to  demonstrate  a  non-linear 
relationship  between  dividends  and  insiders  ownership  which  differs 
markedly when companies belong to each of the two distinct legal systems 
under  consideration.  We  do  not  focus  on  other  characteristics  of 
shareholders as do other strands of literature
1. 
Our  results  breed  new  insights  into  the  role  of  dividend  policy  as  a 
disciplining  mechanism  in  countries  with  different  legal  systems,  disparate 
control structures, and distinct agency problems.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the arguments and evidence on the importance of the legal environment as a 
determinant  of  corporate  governance  structures  and  the  role  of  insider 
ownership and corporate payout policy as monitoring mechanisms. Section 3 
lays out the hypotheses to be tested, while the following section describes 
the  data  and  methodology.  Section  5  presents  and  discusses  the  major 
results. The final section summarizes and discusses the paper’s contribution 
to the literature. 
 
2.  DIVIDENDS  AND  INSIDER  OWNERSHIP:  A  LAW  AND  FINANCE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
  Recent  research  suggests  that  when  the  economic  environment  in 
which firms operate is not the same, agency problems will potentially differ 
with the consequence that the solutions proposed within a certain institutional 
context,  in  particular  the  Anglo-Saxon  one,  may  not  necessarily  be 
appropriate in another environment, such as the Civil Law legal system. This 
recent research falls within the "Law and Finance" approach which has given 
rise to numerous papers that discuss the influence of different institutional 
aspects on company policies. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and La Porta et al. 
(1997,  1998,  2000a,  2000b  and  2002)  have  pioneered  this  field  and  their 
                                                                        
1
  See,  for  instance  Gugler,  2003,  on  the  different  impact  of  government-controlled  or 
shareholder-controlled ownership structures on dividend policies. 
   6 
work  confirms  that  differences  in  company  decision-making  relate  to  the 
country origin of those companies and that those differences might, primarily, 
be  due  to  each  country' s  legal  tradition  and  related  institutional  features 
peculiar to each economy. 
  In the typical large Anglo-Saxon company, a high degree of consensus 
among researchers prevails around the idea that the main existing agency 
problem  is  centered  on  the  relationship  between  shareholders  and  the 
executive  managers  (Berle  and  Means,  1932).  This  problem  influences 
corporate governance and, as a consequence, company decision-making.  In 
such context, dividends may be used by firms not just as a simple vehicle to 
return cash to shareholders, or as an instrument to communicate information 
about the firm (Miller and Rock, 1985),  but also as a way of reducing the 
degree of value-destroying managerial decisions over the use of free cash 
flows (Jensen,  1986). So, in this context, when shareholders  protection is 
higher, larger dividends can arguably be distributed as the result of better 
legal  rights,  so  as  to  curb  value-destroying  managerial  actions.  This 
argument follows closely La Porta el al’s (2000b) “outcome” agency model of 
dividends which predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be 
associated with higher dividend payouts. 
In  addition  to  dividend  policy,  and  still  within  the  same  agency 
framework, insider ownership can also function as an alignment mechanism 
(Morck  et  al,  1988).  One  might  thus  expect  a  substitution  effect  to  occur 
between dividends and insider ownership, with dividend payout ratios having 
a negative relationship with holdings by managers. However, as documented 
by Morck et al in the US, and by Short and Keasey (1999) in the UK, the 
relationship between insider holdings and the value of the company may be 
non-linear as an insider entrenchment effect may occur at high ownership 
levels.  This  means  that  after  a  certain  critical  level  of  insider  ownership, 
larger stakes in the firm by managers can aggravate agency problems and 
thus  render  dividend  payments  more,  not  less,  necessary  to  compensate 
entrenchment-related new agency costs being created by excessive insider 
ownership. This suggests that a U-shaped pattern may be prevalent in the 
relationship between dividends and ownership by managers.  Consistent with   7 
that hypothesis, Schooley and Barney (1994) and Farinha (2003) document 
such non-linear relationship between dividend payouts and insider holdings 
in the US and UK, respectively. 
  However, when applying this perspective to another context such as, 
for  example,  Continental  Europe,  the  pieces  may  not  necessarily  fall  into 
place in quite the same way. According to La Porta et al. (1997), this can be 
due to the existence of institutional factors arising from the legal background 
of  each  country,  in  particular  the  key  institutional  aspect  of  the  level  of 
investor protection.   Their research confirms that there are countries in which 
shareholder rights have greater legal protection than in others, implying that 
distinct  legal  and  institutional  systems  shape  different  types  of  corporate 
governance by favouring a particular level of ownership concentration. It may 
also  affect  the  usage  of  debt  for  project  financing,  the  degree  of  external 
investors  participation  in  the  firm,  and  even  the  particular  level  of  capital 
market development.    
  Central  to  this  question  are  two  separate  legal  traditions:  Common 
Law and Civil Law.  The former lies within the domain of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in which the degree of investor protection is greater (La Porta el al, 
1997).  The  tradition  based  on  Civil  Law  is  mostly  found  in  mainland 
European countries and those falling under their sphere of influence. Unlike 
the  former,  this  branch  of  law  is  less  homogeneous  and,  in  fact,  three 
separate branches are identifiable – the French, Scandinavian and German 
ones-  which,  while  all  having  their  roots  in  Roman  Law,  show  also  some 
minor  differences  in  the  evolution  and  subsequent  refinement  of  their 
respective systems. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon countries, in those countries that 
ascribe to the Civil Law tradition, the degree of shareholder protection is not 
nearly as great and the rights of small shareholders can be impinged upon by 
the  presence  and  behaviour  of  large  shareholders,  who  may  try  to  wield 
power  in  groups,  often  alongside  the  company' s  creditors.  In  this 
environment, La Porta el al (1999) and Faccio et al (2001) argue that the 
basic agency problem may not be that between managers and shareholders, 
but  instead  the  one  arising  from  conflicts  between  large  and  small 
shareholders.     8 
 
  A consequence is that in Civil Law countries dividend policy may act 
mostly  as  a  protective  mechanism  for  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders, 
therefore  having  a  monitoring  role  that  differs  both  qualitatively  and 
quantitatively from countries within the Anglo-Saxon world. A symptom of this 
is La Porta et al’s (2000b) evidence that corporations pay higher dividends in 
countries  with stronger legal  protection  of minority shareholders, as is the 
case with Common Law in contrast with Civil Law countries. 
 
  Bearing in mind this and the fact that in Civil Law countries the degree 
of shareholder concentration is usually much higher than in Common Law 
countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002), we argue that, as the result of the high 
degree  of  control  enjoyed  by  owners  and  potential  expropriating  threats 
allowed  by  the  Civil  Law  environment,  dividend  payouts  will  increase  as 
insiders  ownership  grows  so  as  to  compensate  the  greater  likelihood  of 
minority  expropriation.  This  is  needed  particularly  to  entice  external 
shareholders to invest in the company as corporations compete for funds in 
capital markets. However, when reaching a critical higher level of ownership 
concentration,  dividends  may  be  curtailed  by  entrenched  majority 
shareholders  in  an  attempt  to  expropriate  minority  shareholders  wealth, 
precisely in those cases where those minority shareholders not only have a 
reduced voting power and little legal rights protection but also may be largely 
irrelevant for the company’s capital funding needs. As a result, the relation 
between  dividends  and  insider  ownership  might  still  be  non-linear,  as  in 
Common Law countries, but in a symmetrical way. 
 
3.  RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The relation that we expect to obtain between dividend payments and 
insider ownership is not linear, and is such that different signs might arise at 
different  levels  of  ownership  (Crutchley  et  al.,  1999).  In  addition,  we  also 
propose  that  the  relation  will  be  different  according  to  each  institutional 
environment  (Common  Law  or  Civil  Law)  since  agency  problems  and 
company governance will also differ.    9 
In  particular,  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  where  ownership  levels  by 
insider  shareholders  in  large  listed  firms  is  typically  low,  dividends  as  a 
mechanism  to  reduce  agency  problems  may  be  important  as  substitute  
monitoring mechanisms for insider holdings. As ownership in the company by 
insider  shareholders  increases,  their  interests  become  increasingly  more 
aligned  with those  of the remaining shareholders  thereby minimizing  such 
problems as those arising from the discretionary usage of free liquid assets 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, in that situation, dividend payments will be lower 
since there will no longer be the same need to use these as a monitoring 
mechanism.  However,  at  higher  levels  of  managerial  ownership  an 
entrenchment  effect  may  come  to  dominate  that  changes  the  negative 
relationship between the managerial ownership level and the dividend policy 
into a positive one. As entrenched insider shareholders are more willing to 
take decisions that are more in accordance with their own interests rather 
than  those  of  other  shareholders,  dividends  can  become  increasingly 
necessary  to  counter-balance  such  entrenchment-related  agency  costs. 
Schooley  and  Barney  (1994),  Farinha  (2003)  and  Da  Silva  et  al  (2004) 
present evidence consistent with such U-shaped relationship.  
In  accordance  with  Laporta  el  al’s  (2000b)  “outcome”  theory,  the 
increase  in  dividends  may  occur  as  the  result  of  a  minority  shareholders-
protecting legal system that empowers those investors to demand and obtain 
larger cash payouts. 
In addition, we postulate that at very high levels of ownership a new 
reduction in dividend payments will occur as a result of a new alignment of 
interests effect, similar to that obtained in empirical studies by McConnell and 
Servaes  (1990)  and  Morck  et  al.  (1988).  At  extreme  levels  of  insider 
ownership,  the  scope  for  misalignment  of  interests  between  owners  and 
managers is very limited and, given that in Common Law countries minority 
rights are better protected, the likelihood of minority expropriation will be very 
low and therefore, dividends will not be much needed to deal with agency 
problems  of  little  relevance.  As  a  consequence,  dividend  payments  may 
decrease as insider ownership reaches particularly high levels. A counter-
argument, however, is that if minority holdings are in those cases very low,   10
controlling  shareholders  face  a  reduced  liquidity  for  their  shares  and  may 
therefore be tempted to increase dividend payouts. Although Farinha (2003) 
did  not  find  corroborating  evidence  for  such  hypothesis  in  the  UK,  this  is 
mainly an empirical and open question when in presence of firms in Common 
Law countries as arguments can reasonably be produced in those two ways.  
The  first  null  hypothesis  of  a  negative-positive-negative  relation 
between dividend payouts and insider ownership is therefore proposed as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: As  insider ownership increases, dividends payouts of 
companies  in  Common  Law  countries  first  decrease,  then,  after  a  certain 
critical level, increase, and finally decrease once again after a second, higher 
critical value.  
In  contrast,  in  countries  based  in  Continental  Europe  (Civil  Law 
tradition) insider  ownership is mostly associated with large shareholders who 
control,  through  many  varied  mechanisms  such  as  corporate  networks  or 
family  links  (Faccio  and  Lang,  2002),  the  management  board  of  the 
companies in question. In this environment, at lower levels of ownership by 
these dominant groups, the existence of dividend payments can occur so as 
to  distribute  funds  to  dispersed  small  shareholders  who  have  less  legal 
protection in these countries. In this case, the need to signal an alignment of 
interests  between  majority  and  minority  owners  motivates  higher  dividend 
payments, contrary to what happens in Anglo-Saxon countries. Such conduct 
may thus serve as a signal to small shareholders that those controlling the 
company  are  not  going  to  tap  corporate  profits  by  expropriating  small 
shareholders.  Therefore,  as  firms  compete  for  external  funds,  dividend 
payouts will have to be offered to entice minority investors to supply funds to 
these firms or liquidity for its shares. As insider ownership grows in these 
companies,  fears  might  also  grow  that  increasingly  powerful  controlling 
shareholders  will  expropriate  other  investors,  forcing  corporations  to  pay 
more generous dividends if they are to attract external shareholders funding.    11
However,  at higher levels  of ownership  an  entrenchment effect  can 
come  to  dominate,  in  which  case  controlling  shareholders  might  start  to 
reduce dividend payments with the aim of expropriating the wealth of small 
shareholders to use those freed up resources for private profit (Faccio et al., 
2001 and Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003), thus changing the formerly positive 
relation between insider ownership and dividends into a negative one. This 
may occur particularly if they feel that minority shareholders have become 
largely  irrelevant  for  company  funding  or  liquidity  purposes
2.  But  in  these 
companies as well, at an even higher and extreme ownership levels on the 
part of controlling shareholders, again the relation between insider ownership 
and dividends might change its sign, this time from negative to positive. This 
might  happen  because  of  liquidity  needs  faced  by  the  controlling 
shareholders. 
A number of studies in Civil Law countries have suggested that the 
impact of insider ownership on firm value or on dividends paid is non-linear. 
Thomsen  (2005)  suggests  a  non-linear  relationship  between  insiders  and 
dividends paid but his study observes a negative effect only for the sample of 
companies from civil law countries. And for instance, in the case of Spain, 
empirical evidence exists to support a cubic relation between ownership by 
the managerial team and the valuation of the company, as identified by De 
Miguel and Pindado (2001), as well as Fernández-Manso and Gómez-Ansón 
(2002). 
The  following  null  hypothesis  of  a  positive-negative-positive  relation 
between dividend payouts and insider ownership is therefore proposed for 
firms in countries with a Civil Law tradition: 
Hypothesis  2:  As  insider  ownership  increases,  dividend  payouts  of 
companies of Civil Law countries first increase, then, after a certain critical 
level, fall, and finally grow once again after a second, higher critical value.  
 
                                                                        
2 This could happen, for instance, after the end of a period of “hot IPOs” when majority 
shareholders sought liquidity and possibly overpricing for their shares, or after a period of 
rapid growth when external funds were needed.    12
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. SAMPLE AND VARIABLES  
The  information  required  to  test  the  two  hypotheses  that  were 
advanced in the previous section has been gathered from different sources. 
The Compustat Database was used to obtain firm financial data. Information 
on  US  company  ownership  over  the  period  1996-2000,  during  which  the 
research was conducted, was collected from Deloitte and Touch's Peerscope 
and Investor Insight's Market Guide databases. Amadeus, provided by the 
Bureau van Dijk, was used for ownership data on European companies. La 
Porta et al.' s (1997) international data on Shareholders and Creditors rights 
was also used.  
  The final sample is shown in table 1. As can be seen from the table, 
the sample is composed of 931 companies over the period 1996-2000 and 
involves  a  total  of  4,092  firm-year  observations.  Of  the  total  number  of 
companies, 462 are from the US and 469 are European.  
(insert table 1) 
The US data was compiled by crossing financial information obtained 
from  the  Compustat  database  and  information  on  company  ownership 
obtained from the Peerscope and Market guide databases. The sample of 
around 2,000 companies on which information was held on both databases, 
was  considerably  and  progressively  reduced  as  the  research  period  was 
lengthened  to  five  years,  so  as  to  amass  a  data  panel  that  would  be 
sufficiently  meaningful.  Another  factor  that  reduced  the  sample  was  the 
availability of market data on those companies.  
Regarding  the  sample  obtained  for  European  companies,  similar 
procedures  were  taken  as  in  the  case  of  US  companies.  First,  financial 
information was obtained from the Compustat database for the period under 
examination. The following step was then to merge this information with the 
ownership data taken from the Amadeus database, leading to a data panel   13
including a total of 469 companies, a number which is close to that of the US 
sample.  Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for these two samples. 
( insert table 2) 
Table 2 shows that, of the 469 European companies, 167 belong to 
countries following the French variant of Civil Law that represents 35.61% of 
the  total  sample  for  this  Continent.  This  branch  of  Civil  Law  is  the  most 
extensive within the different countries of the sample. Although, as may be 
seen, the companies in the sample are mainly French, Spanish and Belgian, 
there are also 79 companies that share the German Civil Law tradition, which 
represents 16.84% of the European sample, the majority of which are based 
in Germany although  there are  also firms from Austria. The Scandinavian 
branch  is  the  least  represented  of  the  three,  comprising  56  firms  from 
Sweden and Denmark, which represent 12% of the total European sample. 
Finally, information has been gathered on 167 European firms that belong to 
the Common Law tradition, as do those from the US, almost all of which are 
British  except  for  two  Irish  firms,  which  together  constitute  35.61%  of  the 
sample on Europe. In this case, the number of European countries with this 
legal code is not very numerous whereas the number of companies listed on 
their  stock  exchanges  is.  Hence,  companies  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  world, 
have a relevant presence in our sample of European firms. 
The variable that will be used as a dependent variable is the dividend 
yield  ratio  (DIV)  measured  as  the  dividends  divided  by  the  market 
capitalization of the firm’s equity. The dividend yield of the previous financial 
year  will  also  be  used  among  the  explanatory  variables.  The  dividend 
payments made in the previous year are an important consideration when 
adopting  the  dividend  policy  for  a  particular  year  (Lintner,  1956).  The 
dividend payout rate (the ratio between dividends paid out by the firm in a 
financial year and the book value of total assets in the same year) will also be 
used for robustness checks.  
In terms of the ownership structure variables, our insider shareholders'  
ownership  level  variable  (INSI)  is  measured  in  very  broad  terms.  It  is   14
calculated as the total percentage of all shares owned by the members of the 
managerial  team,  both  executive  and  non-executive  board  members,  in 
addition to those owned by shareholders whose stake is over 5% of the total 
shares of the company. In our case, it seemed more appropriate to use this 
variable instead of the level of executive ownership. As already mentioned, in 
continental  European  countries  conflicts  between  large  and  small 
shareholders are arguably more prominent than those between shareholders 
and  managers.  In  such  a  context  the  usage  of  more  traditional  variables 
based  on  direct  executive  ownership,  often  employed  in  corporate 
governance  research,  will  not  be  the  most  meaningful  one.  We  therefore 
define  the  insider  ownership  variable  as  to  include  large  shareholders 
ownership along with executive shareholdings as it is very likely that these 
are  intertwined  in  these  countries.  Data  for  this  variable  is  found  on  the 
Thomson Financial, Marketguide, Worldvest base databases and is used in 
studies by Short et al. (2002), and Chen and Steiner (1999), among others. 
We also use a variable that measures the level of ownership by institutional 
investors (INST) which are particularly important in Anglo-Saxon firms where 
ownership by pension funds, investment trusts and other similar investors is 
frequently  more  significant  than  that  by  individual  investors  or  families.  In 
Civil Law companies, although the influence of such institutional investors is 
not as relevant as in Common Law countries, their importance has certainly 
been increasing in recent years. 
As control variables we use company size (LOGACT), calculated as 
the log of the book value of total assets (since different behavioural patterns 
might possibly exist between large and small firms), the market-to-book (MB) 
ratio  and  the  debt  level  of  the  company  (DR),  calculated  as  the  ratio  of 
between the book value of debt and the book value of total assets. Finally, 
we use data on shareholders (SR) and creditors rights (CR) from La Porta et 
al. (1997) in order to include two proxy variables for these institutional factors 
in each country. Also, a dummy variable  (ANGLO) is used to differentiate 
countries according to whether these share a tradition of Common or Civil 
Law,  where  a  value  of  1  is  assigned  for  firms  from  the  US,  the  United 
Kingdom or Ireland (Common Law countries), and a value of 0 for all other   15
firms. This variable identifies the origins of each company and allows us to 
relate,  in  each  case,  dividend  policy  to  the  explanatory  variables  that  are 
used, thereby enabling us to confirm whether differences regarding dividend 
decision  exist  between  firms  from  countries  upholding  the  Anglo-Saxon 
tradition  of  Common  Law  and  those  from  countries  in  which  Civil  Law  is 
prevalent (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003). 
4.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL  
The extended model that we use in our empirical analysis is as follows:    
DIVit=b0 + b1 DIVi(t-1)+ (b2+ a2ANGLOi)INSIit+ (b3+a3ANGLOi)INSI
2+ 
(b4+a4ANGLOi) INSIit
3+ (b5+ a5ANGLOi)INSTIit + (b6+a6ANGLOi)DRit+  
(b7+a7ANGLOi)MBit+ d1 SRi+ d2 CRi+ (b7+a7ANGLOi)LOGACTit + hi+ nit  (1) 
DIVit is defined either as dividend  yield  (dividends divided by market 
capitalization of equity), or as the ratio between dividends and total assets. 
This variable was previously censored using a Tobit model given that one 
cannot  directly include such in  a Generalized  Method of Moments  (GMM) 
panel without it being censored, as referred by Arellano and Bover (1997); 
INSIit  is  the  ownership  by  insider  shareholders  as  a  percentage  of  total 
shares;  INST  is  the  degree  of  institutional  ownership;  DRit  represents  the 
level of debt defined as the ratio between the book value of debt and total 
assets;  MBit  is  the  market-to  book  ratio;  SR  and  CR  are  indexes  for 
shareholders and creditors rights ,respectively, as taken from La Porta et al. 
(1997); LOGACT measures size, defined as the log of the book value of the 
assets. ANGLO is a dummy variable where a value of 1 is assigned for firms 
from the US, United Kingdom or Ireland (Common Law countries), and a 0 
for all other firms (Civil Law firms). 
We test this model with panel data to allow the values taken over time 
by a series of variables to be known on an individual basis
3. The use of this 
methodology  has  a  number  of  advantages  when  compared  with  a  cross 
                                                                        
3 The panel data used is characterized as being incomplete or unbalanced. In particular, the variant 
chosen for this work is referred to a micropanel data, which is to say, a data group in which the dominant 
dimension corresponds to the number of individuals while the number of periods is significantly lower.   16
sectional  data.  The  first  is  the  so-called  control  of  constant  unobserved 
heterogeneity. In our case, the particular singularities of the firms can affect 
their  dividend  payment  policies,  as  already  stated,  and  such  features  can 
persist for long periods of time. The second is the dynamic dimension of our 
data panel that allows dividend policies to vary according to the proposed 
explanatory variables over a period of time and furthermore considers the 
impact on dividends in the light of changes in the model' s other variables. 
Nevertheless, the model is also subject to some potential problems, the 
most  important  being  the  existence  of  constant  unobservable  effects 
correlated  with  the  explanatory  variables  that  may  cause  ordinary  least 
squares  estimators  to  be  inconsistent.  One  possible  solution  would  be  to 
consider intergroup estimates, but such estimators are only consistent when 
the explanatory variables in the model are exogenous, which is to say when 
these are not correlated with the model' s random terms (effects). 
In our case, the existence of individual effects as well as endogenous 
effects within the dividends and the model' s variables for insider ownership 
lead  us  to  consider  the  variables  in  first  differences  and  to  estimate  the 
parameters of the model using the generalized method of moments
4.  
In  addition,  the  statistical  models  used  to  analyze  time  series  and 
transversal data are shown to have important complications when applied to 
censored variables (Maddala, 2001). The procedure used for the estimation 
of the model, bearing in mind that the variable for dividends is a censored 
variable that takes neither negative values nor values above one, is the Tobit 
model. The first stage of this procedure consists in obtaining estimates of the 




                                                                        
4 Estimation of the model's parameters was calculated using the Stata 7.0 programme that is an 
adaptation of the DPD, Dynamic Panel Data, programme written by Arellano and Bond (1988).   17
5.  RESULTS 
The results are shown in tables 3 and 4
6. In the first table, descriptive 
statistics on the most significant variables used in firms within each legal and 
institutional  framework  reveal  the  existence  of  important  and  significant 
differences between the two sets of firms. 
(insert table 3) 
Table  3  reveals  that  Anglo-Saxon  firms  on  average  pay  out  more 
dividends, carry less of a debt burden - with levels of debt that do not reach 
30%    of  total  liabilities,  against  50%  in  firms  from  Civil  Law  countries  -, 
display  an  ownership  structure  that  is  characterized  by  a  much  higher 
participation  of  institutional  investors  –  reaching  40%  of  total  ownership 
against a mere 7% for firms within the Civil Law tradition - and have greater 
opportunities for growth than firms in continental Europe (as measured by the 
market-to-book ratio). If a greater degree of shareholder protection is added 
to this already dissimilar model of financial architecture, a picture emerges of 
the different scope of agency problems in companies within the two legal and 
institutional frameworks and, consequently, of the different dividend policies 
that are adopted. 
Table  4  shows  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  variables  in  our 
model, first for Anglo Saxon firms and then for Civil Law firms, followed by 
the coefficients for the institutional variables and the results of the statistic 
tests. In the following columns we undertook robustness checks by changing 
the dependent variable to dividend yield (dividends over market capitalization 
of the firm’s equity), and then including in column III and IV the INSI variable 
as  a  squared  and  cubed  variable  while  keeping  dividend  yield  as  the 
dependent variable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 To do so, the Lintner model was used as the basis for a model according to which the dividends 
variable, which will later be object of a comparison in the panel, was censored.   
6 Year dummies were included as explanatory variables but are not reported in Table 4 for 
simplicity. Only the coefficient for the 2000 year dummy showed some statistical significance at the 
10% level. 
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( insert table 4) 
The results obtained for the estimated coefficients confirm that insider 
ownership  exercises  a  distinct  influence  on  firm’s  dividend  payments 
according to the particular institutional environment. In Anglo-Saxon firms, we 
initially  obtain  a  negative  relationship  between  dividends  and  insider 
ownership  which  is  in  accordance  with  an  alignment  of  interests  effect 
between shareholders and directors where dividends become less necessary 
to  deal  with  potential  conflicts  of  interest  between  these  two  parties. 
Nevertheless, when analysing the positive coefficient for the squared value of 
insider ownership (INSI
2), one can observe that at greater levels of insider 
shareholder ownership the relation between this variable and dividend policy 
becomes positive. This agrees with the idea that dividend policy becomes 
more relevant when an entrenchment effect becomes dominant, worsening 
the  agency  problems  associated  with  conflicts  between  shareholders  and 
managers. Finally, the negative coefficient on the cubed variable of insider 
ownership (INSI
3) is consistent with a new alignment effect that prevails over 
an  entrenchment  effect  when  insider  ownership  reaches  particularly  high 
levels.  In  this  way,  a  non-linear  relation  between  dividends  and  insider 
ownership becomes apparent as  was obtained by previous literature. This 
result  confirms  Hypothesis  1  in  this  paper.  The  inflection  points  of  the 
ownership  levels  for  firms  from  these  countries  can  be  obtained  from  the 
solutions to the equations (1i) substituting for the values obtained from the 
coefficients  as  we suggest in  the  appendix of this paper. This  gives  us a 
value for z1 of around 36% and for z2 of 95% implying that the alignment 
effect that gives rise to lower dividends takes place at insider shareholder 
ownership levels of between 0 and 36%. Figure 1 shows the results obtained 
for firms from each institutional background, solely taking into consideration 
for the dividend ratio the effect of insider ownership.   
 This result is similar to that obtained by Farinha (2003) for a sample of 
British  firms,  who  also  finds  an  inflection  point  at  around  30%  of  insider 
ownership. We find, however, a new alignment effect starting at 95% insider 
ownership,  which  is  to  say,  when  the  ownership  of  the  firm  is  almost 
completely  under  the  control  of  insiders,  which  is  in  accordance  with  the   19
argument  that  liquidity  becomes  important  for  insider  shareholders  when 
ownership is extremely concentrated. 
Table  5  reveals  the  number  of  firms  between  each  critical  insider 
ownership level that has been identified. The 36% critical level splits almost 
evenly the sample of Anglo-Saxon firms, yielding statistical strength to the 
estimated non-linear relationship between dividends and insider ownership. 
However, the results for the second inversion point are relatively weak as we 
find only six firms above the 95% threshold.  
In  the  case  of  firms  from  countries  with  a  tradition  of  Civil  Law  a 
significant relation is also obtained for dividends payments for the variables 
that measure the ownership by insider shareholders (INSI). As expected, the 
results obtained here are different from the Anglo-Saxon case and confirm 
our  Hypothesis  2.  In  a  context  of  little  institutional  protection  for  minority 
shareholders, increasing insider shareholder ownership initially leads to an 
increased expropriation threat and therefore to higher dividend payments as 
a  means  to  reduce  such  threat.  Subsequently,  this  relation  changes  from 
positive to negative, as reflected in the negative coefficient for the squared 
value of insider ownership (INSI
2), consistent with the assertion that at higher 
levels of ownership these shareholders are in a position that enables them to 
expropriate wealth from the small shareholders, and a symptom of that is the 
reduction  in  dividends  at  those  levels  of  ownership  (Faccio  et  al.,  2001; 
Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). Finally, a new positive relation emerges at even 
greater levels of ownership, as shown by the positive relation between the 
variable  of  the  cubed  value  (INSI
3)  and  the  dividend  variable.  The  cut-off 
points can occur in these countries in just the same way as they do in the 
case of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Thus, the value for z1 and z2, according 
to steps proposed in the appendix of this paper, are 46% and 77%. In brief, 
this means that at insider shareholder ownership levels of up to 46%, in firms 
from  Civil  Law  countries,  an  alignment  of  interests  effect  occurs  between 
large and small shareholders that leads to greater dividend payments; from 
that  level  and  up  to  insider  shareholder  ownership  levels  of  77  %,  an 
entrenchment effect is evident that leads to wealth being expropriated and 
smaller  dividends  being  paid  out  to  the  small  shareholders.  Finally,  at   20
ownership levels greater than 77%, the results are consistent with liquidity 
needs from the part of majority shareholders driving a (once again) positive 
relation between dividend payments and insider holdings.  
From Table 4 one can also observe a statistically significant negative 
impact of the DIV variable from the previous period. Although, as referred 
earlier,  one  would  expect,  instead,  a  positive  impact    (Lintner,  1956),    it 
should be kept in mind that the 1996-2000 sample period a dramatic fall in 
dividend payments was observed in many countries, as observed by Fama 
and  French  (2001),  although  in  later  years,  particularly  after  2003,  this 
phenomena  has  somewhat  reversed.  Thus,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the 
negative sign observed in Table 4 for the DIV variable may well reflect this 
particular feature of recent aggregate dividend behaviour. 
The Wald test of table 4 allows us to test the null hypothesis of all the 
coefficients  being  simultaneously  equal  to  zero.  The  Sargan  test  for  the 
conditions of overidentification, allows us to test the null hypothesis that the 
overidentification restrictions used are valid, that is, that the instruments used 
are valid. The m1 and m2 tests allow us to detect potential first order and 
second order serial autocorrelation. The values obtained by the Wald test, 
the  Sargan  test  and  the  second  order  serial  correlation  for  both  samples 
allow us to confirm the validity of the instruments used and the absence of 
second order correlation. 
Table 5 shows that the number of firms below and after the two critical 
levels of insider ownership is substantial, even after the second threshold of 
77%  (205  firms),  thus  yielding  statistical  significance  to  the  conclusions 
above. 
Finally, we repeated the regressions in Table 4 with the exclusion of 
outliers  (i.e.,  the  most  extreme  values  for  both  the  dependent  and 
independent variables) but the results remained essentially unchanged. 
( insert table 5) 
(insert Figure 1)   21
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The  results  obtained  from  our  empirical  model  show  a  relation 
between  insider  ownership  dividend  policy  which  is  remarkably  different 
between the two legal and institutional environments (Civil or Common Law), 
although  in  both  cases  following  non-linear  patterns.  In  particular,  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  (Common  Law)  countries  where  lower  concentrations  of 
ownership and better minority rights protection determine agency problems 
which  are  fundamentally  centered  on  the  relation  between  managers  and 
shareholders, our results for firms in these countries show a negative relation 
between insider ownership and dividend payouts at ownership levels below 
36% or above 95%, and a positive one between those two critical levels. This 
is  in  accordance  with  a  growing  convergence  of  interests  between 
management  and  shareholders  when  the  concentration  of  ownership 
increases but is maintained at percentages below the 36% first critical level 
or above 95%. In those situations dividends seem to lose their importance as 
a  mechanism  for  reducing  agency  problems  arising  between  these  two 
parties. On the other hand, for ownership levels between these two inflection 
points  a  positive  relation  is  observed  between  both  variables,  which  we 
interpret as the result of an entrenchment effect, causing dividend payments 
once again to become necessary to reduce this new type of agency problem. 
After the second critical insider ownership level (95%), dividends are reduced 
once  again,  in  accordance  with  an  alignment  of  interests  effect  that  is 
apparently stronger than any possible drive for liquidity on the part of majority 
shareholders. 
In firms originating from countries with the tradition of Civil Law, we 
observe quite a different pattern in the relation between insider ownership 
and dividends, albeit still a non-linear one. Given the low level of protection of 
minority  shareholders  in  those  countries,  dividend  payments  increase  as 
insider ownership becomes more concentrated until a critical level of 46% 
ownership, possibly as a way of enticing external shareholders to invest in 
the  company.  A  positive  association  between  dividends  and  internal 
ownership becomes then observable when insider ownership rises above the 
level of 77%, consistent with liquidity needs faced by majority shareholders   22
when ownership is very concentrated. However, when insider shareholders 
exercise majority control over the firm, with levels of participation at around 
half of total shares, dividends are cut back which could well be explained by 
a strategy of assigning resources that is orientated more towards obtaining 
private benefits rather than the creation of value for all shareholders. 
The existence of a non-linear relation between insider ownership and 
dividend payouts is clearly depicted in our study, therefore, as is the different 
non-linear  pattern  of  the  relationship  between  the  two  variables  that  is 
dependent on the legal and institutional framework (Common or Civil Law) 
within  which  the  firms  operate.  The  results  are  consistent  with  our 
hypothesis, breed fresh insights into the monitoring role of both ownership by 
insiders and dividend policies when the institutional and legal environment is 
not characterised by a Common Law framework, and seriously question the 
applicability  to  Civil  Law  environments  of  results  obtained  from  empirical 
studies undertaken in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
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Appendix 
In  equation  (1),  the  INSI  variable  is  represented  as  a  squared  and 
cubed variable in order to check the different relations that may arise from 
the  dividend  policy  according  to  the  extent  of  the  insider  shareholders'  
ownership levels. On that basis, two inflection points can be obtained where 
a change in the behaviour of insider shareholders is possible. To do so, the 
following  methodology  is  used,  as  employed  by  Morck  et  al.  (1988)  for  a 
sample of firms from the US, by Short and Keasey (1999) for firms in the 
United  Kingdom,  and  by  De  Miguel  et  al.  (2002)  for  Spanish  firms.  In 
equation (9), the DIV variable is first derived with respect to INSI: 
0 3 2
2
3 2 = + + = ¶ z z z
y g g g             (1i) 
In order to simplify the annotation, a substitution was made in such a 
way that the variable DIVit is represented by y, INSIit by z, and the quotient 
(bi+ai ANGLO) by gi. Solving the equation (1i) gives us: 
3




g g g g - - -
= z  
3




g g g g - + -
= z  
Based on our research hypothesis, for Anglo-Saxon firms these two 
optimums have to correspond to a minimum for z1 and a maximum for z2. 
Whereas, for firms in countries with a Civil Law tradition, the contrary is true, 
since  in  this  case  as  has  been  postulated  in  this  paper  and  in  line  with 
studies  by  Faccio  et  al  (2001),  and  Gugler  and  Yurtoglu  (2003),  the 
alignment- of-interests in those countries implies greater dividend payments. 
Thus, if we apply the second partial derivative and z1 is indeed at a minimum 
in the Anglo-Saxon firms and at a maximum in firms based in continental 
Europe, hypothesis 1 and 2 will have been confirmed. Formally, 














g - < z   for firms based in an Anglo-Saxon environment, in 
which case z1 > z2 , whereas for firms following the Civil Law 
tradition z1< z2.   25
TABLES 
Table 1. Number of firms and international distribution of the sample 
  Firms  Observations 
USA  462  1.830 
Europe  469  2.262 
Total  931  4.092 
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Table 2. Sample distribution of European firms by different origin legal 
and country 
  Civil Law tradition   
French origin  Firms  Observations 
France  71  350 
Spain  44  212 
Netherlands  29  151 
Belgium  12  63 
Greece  6  33 
Italy  2  10 
Luxemburg  2  10 
Portugal  1  5 
Total  167  834 
Percentage  35,61%   
German origin  Firms  Observations 
Germany  71  341 
Austria  8  38 
Total  79  379 
Percentage  16,84%   
Scandinavian origin  Firms  Observations 
Denmark  33  158 
Sweden  23  70 
Total  56  228 
Percentage  11,94%   
Common Law tradition 
  Firms  Observations 
United Kingdom  165  811 
Ireland  2  10 
Total  167  821 
Percentage  35,61%     27
 
 Table 3. Summary statistics for Anglo Saxon firms and Civil Law firms  
  Mean  Median  St. Desv.  Máximum  Mínimum 




Anglo  Civil 
 
Anglo  Civil  Anglo  Civil  Anglo  Civil 
                         
DIV  0,018  0,027  0,000  ***  0,011  0,006  0,028  0,112  0,941  0,957  0,000  0,000 
INSI  0,297  0,654  0,000  ***  0,260  0,703  0,234  0,283  1,000  1,000  0,000  0,000 
INST  0,481  0,070  0,000  ***  0,497  0,000  0,255  0,127  1,000  1,000  0,000  0,000 
DR  0,282  0,499  0,000  ***  0,279  0,508  0,193  0,191  0,884  0,962  0,000  0,000 
MB  1,999  0,999  0,000  ***  1,217  0,574  2,444  1,931  13,360  6,220  0,016  0,551 
LOGACT  3,989  2,673  0,000  ***  3,732  2,580  1,684  0,857  7,527  6,689  0,912  1,022 
ROE  0,146  0,142  0,427    0,141  0,127  0,127  0,223  0,946  2,631  -0,478  -1,277 
ROA  0,073  0,068  0,019  ***  0,068  0,058  0,068  0,083  0,366  0,755  -0,262  -0,516 
DIV is the dividend yield, measured as dividends divided by market capitalization of equity; 
INSI is the variable that measures ownership by insider shareholders, calculated as the total 
percentage of all shares owned by the members of the managerial team, both executive and 
non-executive board members, in addition to those owned by shareholders whose stake is 
over  5%  of  the  total  shares  of  the  company;  INST  measures  the  degree  of  institutional 
ownership; Lit represents the level of debt, measured as the ratio between the book value of 
debt and of total assets; MB is the market to book ratio (market capitalization of equity plus 
book  value  of  total  assets  less  book  value  of  equity,  divided  by  the  book  value  of  total 
assets); LOGACT measures firm size as the log of total assets; ROE is the ratio between 
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Table 4.  Results of a Tobit Regression  estimated as a dynamic panel data 
analysis using GMM estimation 
Dependent variable: Dividend yield (DIV) (I to III) or Dividend Payout (IV)  
        I    II    III    IV 
 
      Constant  -0.0280 
(0.0475) 
  -0.0442 
(0.0707) 
  0.1556 
(0.0239) 
***  0.0392 
(1.8401) 
 
      DIVi(t-1)  -1.8570 
(0.1902) 
***  -1.8287 
(0.2083) 
***  -1.6408 
(0.2197) 
***  -1.8787 
(0.1965) 
*** 
         
   
   
   
 
    INSIit  -3.0210 
(1.3127) 
***  -0.2349 
(0.2761) 
  -1.8467 
(0.7934) 
**  -3.4106 
(1.6411) 
*** 
    INSI
2
it  5.3985 
(2.5050) 
***   
  1.3583 
(0.6295) 
**  6.7624 
(3.2352) 
*** 
    INSI
3
it  -2.9283 
(1.4759) 
**   
   
  -3.4689 
(1.9247) 
*** 
    INSTIit  0.0883 
(0.0244) 
***  0.0826 
(0.0271) 
***  0.1042 
(0.0288) 
***  0.1032 
(0.0267) 
*** 
    DRit  -0.4240 
(0.3447) 
**  -0.4993 
(0.4594) 
**  -0.6189 
(0.3342) 
**  -0.4519 
(0.2392) 
* 
    MBit  -0.0151 
(0.0108) 
***  -0.0336 
(0.0102) 
***  -0.0282 
(0.0115) 












    LOGACTit  0.0348 
(0.0103) 
***  0.0287 
(0.0140) 
  0.0025 
(0.0078) 
  0.0266 
(0.0143) 
* 
         
   
   
   
 
    INSIit  4.6665 
(1.1176) 
***  0.4847 
(0.3194) 
*  1.6886 
(0.7186) 
**  4.7768 
(1.5358) 
*** 
    INSI
2
it  -8.9771 
(2.1963) 
***   
  -1.3112 
(0.5806) 
**  -8.3630 
(1.6411) 
*** 
    INSI
3
it  5.0225 
(1.2735) 
***   
   
  4.5414 
(1.7301) 
*** 
    INSTIit  -0.0923 
(0.0590) 
**  -0.1970 
(0.0694) 
**  -0.1315 
(0.6295) 
**  -0.1419 
(0.0694) 
** 
    DRit  0.5173 
(0.3820) 
  1.0882 
(0.5893) 
  0.9616 
(0.4924) 
  0.8627 
(0.4553) 
 
    MBit  -0.0022 
(0.0331) 
  -0.0027 
(0.0289) 
  0.0013 
(0.0427) 











    LOGACTit  -0.6825 
(0.6149) 
**  -0.3141 
(0.8149) 
  0.5189 
(0.5535) 
  -0.8064 
(0.4210) 
 
         
       
   
 
      SRi  0.0384 
(0.0085) 
**  0.0384 
(0.0116) 
**  0.0227 
(0.0100) 
**  0.0313 
(0.0106) 
** 
      CRi  0.0126 
(0.0070) 
  0.0150 
(0.0135) 
  0.0037 
(0.0049) 
  0.0012 
(0.0003) 
 
      Wald test  3180.92 
(24) 
  4180.75 
(20) 
  1325.48 
(20) 
  2695.95 
(24) 
 
      m1  2.66    3.67    0.52 
  3.13 
 
      m2  0    0    0 
  0 
 
      Sargan test  32.15 (22)    13.67 (12)    13.58 (18)    19.66 (14)   
DIV in columns I to III is the dividend yield (dividends to market capitalization ratio); in column 
IV DIV is defined as the dividend payout ratio, measured as the ratio between the dividends   29
paid  out  and  total  assets;  INSI  is  the  variable  that  measures  ownership  by  insider 
shareholders, calculated as the total percentage of all shares owned by the members of the 
managerial team, both executive and non-executive board members, in addition to those 
owned by shareholders whose stake is over 5% of the total shares of the company; INST 
measures the degree of institutional ownership; DR represents the level of debt, measured 
as the ratio between the book value of debt and of total assets; MB is the market to book 
ratio (market capitalization of equity plus book value of total assets less book value of equity, 
divided by the book value of total assets); LOGACT measures firm size as the log of total 
assets; SR and CR are indexes for shareholders and creditors rights, respectively, as taken 
from La Porta et al. ANGLO is a dummy variable where a value of 1 is assigned for firms 
from the US, the United Kingdom or Ireland (from Common Law countries) , and a 0 for all 






Table 5. Number of firms of the sample in each inflection point 
Anglo Saxon (Common Law) firms  Civil Law firms 
Level of INSI  Number of Firms  Level of INSI  Number of Firms 
0-36%  247 firms  0-46%  79 firms 
36-95%  209 firms  46-77%  185 firms 
> 95%  6 firms  > 77%  205 firms 
This table shows the inflection points in the relation between Dividends (DIV) and Insider 
Ownership (INSI) as computed from the estimation of equation (1) under the specification I in 
Table  4  using  the  procedure  detailed  in  the  Appendix.  For  Amglo-Saxon  firms  the  36% 
inflection point corresponds to a relative maximum, while for Civil Law firms the 46% level of 
insider ownership t is a relative minimum (see Figure 1). I DIV is the dividend yield (dividends 
to  market  capitalization  ratio);  INSI  is  the  variable  that  measures  ownership  by  insider 
shareholders, calculated as the total percentage of all shares owned by the members of the 
managerial team, both executive and non-executive board members, in addition to those 
owned by shareholders whose stake is over 5% of the total shares of the company 
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Figure 1. Dividends and insiders ownership in firms of different 
institutional systems  
46% 77%
    











civil law firms common law firms
 
This Figure depicts graphically the relation between Dividends (DIV) and Insider Ownership 
(INSI) as computed from the estimation of equation (1) under the specification I in Table 4 
using the procedure detailed in the Appendix.  DIV is the dividend yield (dividends to market 
capitalization ratio), in percentage terms; INSI is the variable that measures ownership by 
insider shareholders, calculated as the total percentage of all shares owned by the members 
of the managerial team, both executive and non-executive board members, in addition to 
those owned by shareholders whose stake is over 5% of the total shares of the company 
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